INTRODUCTION (E. V. Ohanian and J. A. Moore)
Human risk assessment is based on a series of questions that risk assessors ask about scientific information (hazard ' This workshop was held at the 36th Annual Meeting of the Society of Toxicology (SOT), Cincinnati, OH, on March 9-13, 1997. It was sponsored by the Risk Assessment and Regulatory and Safety Evaluation Sections of the SOT.
identification, dose-response assessment, human exposure assessment) that is relevant to human risk. Each question calls for analysis and interpretation of available studies, selection of the concepts and data that are most scientifically reliable and most relevant to the problem at hand, and scientific conclusions regarding the question presented. Risk characterization is the summarizing step of risk assessment. The risk characterization integrates information from the preceding components of the risk assessment and synthesizes an overall conclusion about risk that is complete, informative, and useful for decision makers or risk managers. According to the March 1995 Risk Characterization Policy and Guidance (Ohanian, 1995; USEPA, 1995 USEPA, , 1996 , each risk characterization should be prepared in a manner that is clear, transparent, reasonable, and consistent with other risk characterizations of similar scope prepared by the USEPA. Risk assessors are charged with (1) generating a credible, objective, realistic, and scientifically balanced analysis; and (2) explaining confidence in each assessment by clearly delineating strengths, limitations, uncertainties, default assumptions, along with the impacts of these factors on the overall assessment. Since every assessment carries uncertainties, a simplified numerical presentation of health risk is always incomplete and often misleading. Characterizing risk to include qualitative information should be encouraged to assure that decision makers are fully informed. The risk managers will integrate these quantitative and qualitative factors into regulatory decisions involving numerous assumptions and uncertainties regarding technology, economics, and social factors. In addition to USEPA's Risk Characterization Policy and Guidance, there are several other reports which emphasize and support USEPA's policy by emphasizing the crucial role of risk assessment and characterization in informed regulatory decision making (NRC, 1994 (NRC, , 1996 AIHC, 1995; RAAC, 1996 , CRARM, 1997 . The purpose of this workshop was to explore new advances in risk characterization.
USEPA RISK CHARACTERIZATION POLICY AND GUIDANCE (J. R. Fowle III)
In 1983, the NRC defined a process for assessing and characterizing risk (NRC, 1983) . Their discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of separating the risk assessment process from the risk management process was interpreted by many to mean that there should be a bright line between risk assessors and risk managers. A decade later, it was more generally recognized that, because of the many uncertainties about exposure and effects, risk assessment is as much a policy-driven as a science-based process (NRC, 1994) . The NRC (1994) noted that ". . .when EPA reports estimates of risk to decision makers and the public, it should present not only point estimates of risk, but also the sources and magnitude of uncertainty associated with those estimates. . ." On March 21, 1995, Administrator Carol Browner issued USEPA's Risk Characterization Policy and Guidance (USEPA, 1995) , noting that ". . .if we are to succeed and build our credibility and stature as a leader in environmental protection for the next century, EPA must be responsive and resolve to more openly and fully communicate to the public, the complexities and challenges of environmental decision making in the face of uncertainty. . ."
USEPA's Risk Characterization Policy and Guidance (USEPA, 1995) contains the four values of Transparency, Clarity, Consistency, and Reasonableness (TCCR), with transparency in the risk assessment process, and clarity, consistency, and reasonableness in the Agency's risk assessment products. A series of colloquia was held for risk assessors and round tables for risk managers to test whether the draft internal Risk Characterization Implementation Plans were sufficiently specific to guide development of risk characterizations, accommodate the statutory and other differences between offices and regions, and provide a basis for evaluation with compliance. The rest of this section discusses some of the USEPA's major findings and conclusions stemming from the colloquia and round tables.
It was universally agreed that risk characterization is the summarizing step of the risk assessment process. Furthermore, it was agreed that risk characterization integrates the information from the hazard identification, dose-response assessment, and exposure assessment portions of the risk assessment in a conscious and deliberate process to bring key aspects of the risk assessment into an integrated picture. The difference between risk characterization and risk assessment is that risk characterization: identifies and explains default options and choices, selection of endpoints from among multiple options; discloses the ranges of predicted risk estimates, not just a single number; provides information about incomplete data bases and the impact on the nature and quality of the risk assessment; gives the peer review status of the information supporting the risk assessment, as well as the assessment itself; and identifies the availability of counteranalyses from opposing groups and explains the supporting analyses and their reasonableness.
There was a general recognition that, while science can tell decision makers something about the nature of risk and its magnitude and likelihood, it cannot tell the decision maker the "safe" level, or whether the public will accept the decision, the political ramifications, etc. Thus, risk characterization provides only one piece to the decision making puzzle. In other words, science informs, but policy decides. Further, the science-driven risk assessment should never be swayed by policy concerns. However, since many uncertainties surround risk assessment, policy calls must be made about what assumptions and models to use in the assessment. These should be clearly defined. Also, it was noted that there are at least six other factors besides science taken into account by decision makers: economics; public values, technology, social concerns, legal requirements, and political factors. USEPA should clearly communicate the application of these various factors to its informed decision making process to gain public acceptance and trust.
There was also general agreement that it is important to define the purpose and scope of each risk assessment before commencing the actual work on it. Environmental exposures are from multiple sources, by multiple stressors and pathways, on multiple populations, and they may result in multiple outcomes. USEPA does not have the mandate, time, resources, or the expertise to address all aspects of environmental and ecological health. This creates a dilemma, because on the one hand USEPA does not want to promise too much, but on the other it does not want to walk away from important health or ecological concerns. The development of a risk management framework, integrating the seven factors considered in decisions at USEPA in a manner consistent with TCCR, could provide a useful tool to help USEPA decide what to do itself and how best to partner with others to protect the environment.
Internal process and peer review were viewed as key ingredients to successful risk characterization. It was noted that risk assessments are conducted by different people at different times, and risk characterizations are done for different audiences and purposes. Sometimes it is appropriate for the risk characterization to be a detailed integrative summary; other times it is appropriate for it to be in a briefing or other condensed format. Thus, it is critical that mechanisms be put into place to ensure that the irreducible set of key points needed for an adequate characterization of risk for each assessment is carried forward in all cases. Internal operating procedures coupled with peer review can provide such assurance.
The risk characterization process is still evolving at USEPA. Current and near-term efforts include developing case studies for risk characterizations supporting the wide variety of assessments done by USEPA, including national standards and site-specific assessments. Round tables to engage USEPA's managers in tailoring risk characterization into workable procedures are currently underway. Because the goal of the Risk Characterization Policy is culture change, the Agency is taking a bottom-up approach to the task. While the policy will take some time to be fully implemented, there are several hopeful signs that progress is being made. Perhaps more importantly, some of the risk characterization principles have found their way into major USEPA products (e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment; USEPA, 1996) . However, the challenges to successful implementation of the policy are real. This coupled with the long time frame needed to implement the policy means that the process will likely be iterative and fitful. However, it is encouraging to see that the Agency is not alone in its efforts. The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (CRARM, 1997) , the American Industrial Health Council (AfflC, 1995) , and others call for risk characterization, and the USEPA looks forward to using their products to help refine its existing risk characterization policy and guidance.
The U.S. Congress mandated a Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management as part of the far-reaching Clean Air Act Amendments of November 1990, together with a NRC report on risk assessment (NRC, 1994) . The Commission was directed to examine: (1) the uses and limitations of risk assessment in environmental decision making; (2) the appropriate exposure scenarios for estimation of risks; (3) the most effective ways to describe or explain uncertainties; (4) various policy issues in risk management; and (5) inconsistencies across agencies. Numerous reports and agency initiatives already addressed risk assessment, but the overriding process of risk management had not been examined systematically. The Commission aimed to create a new Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management (CRARM, 1997) that might take hold as had the framework for risk assessment embodied in NRC's Red Book (NRC, 1983) . The Commission concluded that community stakeholders not only have a right to know, but also have crucial knowledge about sources of exposure, cultural practices, and behavioral patterns that are omitted in standard risk assessment models. The hexagon in Fig. 1 shows the Commission's six-stage process for risk management, emphasizing the central role of stakeholders. The Commission's salient recommendations and responses to external comments can be summarized as follows.
First, the Commission committed itself to overcoming the predominant regulatory strategy of dealing with one chemi- cal at a time, in one environmental medium (air, water, food, soil) at a time, and each risk (cancers, birth defects, ecological hazards) in isolation. Therefore, particular attention was given to the testing and evaluation of significant environmental mixtures. This recommendation does not endorse testing every conceivable combination of every chemical. Mixtures vary over time and place, but representative samples can be and have been tested. Examples are diesel exhausts and Los Angeles smog. It is important to develop a better experimental basis for general assumptions about additivity of risks of various kinds and about potential synergisms. It is an important challenge for agencies and the Congress to cross statutory lines, address overlaps, and use the combination of agency discretion and Congressional oversight to put an emphasis on multimedia, multisource, multiagent, and multirisk context for analysis and decisions. Furthermore, examining multiple risks creates a need for a practicable way to compare risks. There is a scientific dichotomy in the assumptions about the dose-response relationship for chemicals that cause cancers and chemicals (sometimes the same chemicals) that cause brain damage, reproductive impairments, lung damage, or other serious noncancer effects. Risk of cancer is generally considered to reach zero only at zero dose (zero exposure), while other risks are thought to disappear at some appreciable "threshold" level. The 1996 USEPA proposed cancer risk assessment guidelines (USEPA, 1996) take big steps, which the Commission supports, by identifying criteria for cancer-causing agents that deviate from the linear extrapolation to zero dose and by proposing greater use of a margin-of-exposure approach in discussing relative risks.
Second, the focus on risk management reveals other crucial elements in decision making besides the scientific evidence and evaluation of known or potential risks-namely, statutory requirements, technical feasibility, distribution of benefits and costs in the population and among interest groups, political philosophies and commitments, social and cultural perspectives on the nature and extent of a risk, and comparisons with other risks. Nevertheless, scientific investigations and technically sound evaluations of risks are essential to determine whether there is any health problem at all. If the chemical under consideration does not produce any significant adverse effects in animals or humans at levels simulating actual or potential human exposures, much of the subsequent analysis and decision making process becomes irrelevant and should be truncated. In any case, the intensity of risk assessment, uncertainty analysis, economic analysis, and peer review should be scaled to the scientific and social significance of the issues. The Commission supports the use of probabilistic distributions of exposure estimates, which can be verified and related to particular subgroups in the population, but discourages the routine use of quantitative uncertainty methods for dose-response curves and resulting risk estimates, where good narratives may be much more useful at this point.
Third, the Commission recognizes in the risk management world the overriding need to sustain the gains achieved in the past 25 years in environmental health protection, while implementing much more efficient and cost-effective ways of dealing with ongoing and new problems. Setting protective goals in terms of risk reduction and establishing "bright lines" for measurable emission, contamination, and exposure levels should be the responsibility of regulatory and health agencies. The best ways of meeting those goals and compliance standards or levels should be left to responsible parties in a broad stakeholder process, whenever feasible and credible. The Commission also recognizes that the devolution of responsibility to regional, state, and local levels demands much more work to be done in order to better define the respective roles of the public, private, and notfor-profit sectors in solving the diverse problems in question.
Fourth, the Commission decided about a year into its work that the recommendations would be much more salient if we moved beyond general frameworks about toxicity assessment, exposure assessment, variation in susceptibility, description of variability and uncertainty, comparisons of risks, use of economic analyses, peer review, judicial review, and alternatives to command-and-control regulation to offer findings and recommendations program-by-program for the USEPA, OSHA, FDA, and other agencies. Specific recommendations for a win-win modification of the Delaney Clause with regard to pesticide residues and for the Safe Drinking Water Act were recognized by the Congress in productive amendments to those laws late in 1996. The Commission has emphasized the practical value of expressing risks in terms of risk reduction, rather than fighting about abstruse estimates of absolute risk levels and the attendant methods for estimating the uncertainties in the estimates of risk levels. There will be more progress made earlier and with greater cost-effectiveness by moving stepwise in the right direction, instead of paralyzing action in analyses and litigations about ultimate acceptable risk levels.
Finally, in response to comments on the draft framework, the Commission realized that the public was generally supportive, but genuinely skeptical about the feasibility and desirability of engaging stakeholders and putting problems into context. Thus, the Commission created Volume 1 which strictly focuses on the framework for risk management (CRARM, 1997) to explain the six-step process (Fig. 1) , provide guidance for involvement of stakeholders, and give real-world examples of situations in which problems were put into context in partnership with stakeholders.
NEW ADVANCES IN RISK CHARACTERIZATION
(S. C. Lewis) "Risk characterization" has come to center stage. Common themes from reports by the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (CRARM, 1997), the National Research Council (NRC, 1996) and the California Risk Assessment Advisory Committee (RAAC, 1996) suggest recent shifts in thinking about science, science-policy, and the ways in which science and policy-making interplay. Prominent among the shifts in thinking is a deemphasis on separating the two (i.e., distinguishing between scientific analysis and policy-making, as suggested in the NRC, 1983), and toward melding scientificanalytic and political-deliberative processes (NRC, 1996) . The following principles are the product of thoughtful work by 20 or more individuals from various committees and subcommittees of the American Industrial Health Council (AIHC) and are derived from the proceedings of a 1991 AIHC-sponsored workshop (AIHC, 1995) . With the exception of Principle 1 below, the order of the remaining seven principles is not intended to indicate relative importance. Each is critical, in its own right, to excellence in risk characterization.
Principle 1. The sine qua non for a good risk characterization is that it meets the needs of the risk manager (i.e., decision maker). One important way to achieve such alignment is by engaging risk managers and decision makers early and often in "formulating the problem" (i.e., defining the question that the assessment is intended to address). Investments of time and resources in assessing risks should be proportional to the "size" of the problem at hand. In 1994, the NRC endorsed the practice of "tiered risk assessment," i.e., matching investments in risk assessment to the magnitude of the problem (NRC, 1994) . The NRC suggested that "tiered" risk assessments (with each tier reflecting a higher level of complexity and requiring a greater commitment of resources) should be iterative, until at least one of the following conditions is met: (1) the refined estimate of risk is found to be below the applicable decision making level, (2) further investments in investigative science would not be expected to significantly alter the risk estimate, or (3) the stakes (i.e., the pending consequences) are not high enough to warrant the added investment. Smaller scale problems simply do not justify detailed risk assessments. Conversely, big problems justify substantial commitments, both to assessing risks and to managing them. Engaging risk managers early in "scaling" the problem can save time and dollars.
Principle 2. Quantitative estimates should, whenever possible, be expressed as ranges or distributions. Narratives should accompany all such risk characterizations, describing qualitative uncertainties, such as the goodness-of-fit of lowdose/low-response models. A particularly promising tool in this regard is the technique of stochastic modeling, such as Monte Carlo simulation.
Principle 3. Acknowledging assumptions (usually presented as "default inferences") and fully discussing their impacts is essential to good risk characterization, and to effective communication between risk assessors and decision makers. The NRC (1994) recommended that all assumptions (i.e., defaults) be fully acknowledged and their impact thoroughly assessed.
Principle 4. All risk characterizations should explicitly address uncertainty and variability. Of these eight recommendations, this is the most intractable task, particularly, in the area of biological variation in toxicodynamics (i.e., receptor susceptibility). Discussions should cover both qualitative and quantitative sources of uncertainty and their potential influences. Qualitative sources of uncertainty are especially important, inasmuch as those discussions can provide the potentially most valuable guidance regarding additional or follow-up research.
Principle 5. Preparation of risk characterizations should be flexible enough to reflect the inherent uniqueness of specific situations. "One-size-fits-all" is not sound science.
Principle 6. Risk characterizations should include discussion of how the specific risk being characterized compares with other health risks. In the March 1995 Risk Characterization Policy (USEPA, 1995), USEPA recommends that risk characterizations address the following, in part to help stakeholders and communities to assess priorities.
• AIHC is especially interested in advancing the science and application of comparative risk analysis, as a tool for multistakeholder-based priority setting and for improving communication regarding risks and options to reduce them.
Principle 7. A good risk characterization addresses both the "present situation" (i.e., candidate for risk reduction) and the range of reasonable options or alternatives. In addition to quantifying potential benefits (i.e., risk reductions), such discussions provide valuable insight on the potential consequences that would be expected to arise from exercising each of the alternatives (i.e., "substitution risks"). An excellent illustration of this principle comes from the conundrum of drinking water treatment by chlorine. Under certain conditions, chlorine-based disinfection of drinking water can result in small residual amounts of trihalomethanes (THMs) in the finished water. Even small THM residues are thought to carry an excess risk of cancer. One alternative to get rid of THM residues in water is simply to not chlorinate the water, but the risk of bacteriological disease is known to be greater with consumption of nonchlorinated drinking water. It is clear that judgments about the benefits of reducing risks from THM residues is best made in the context of the unavoidable trade-off risks associated with nonchlorinated drinking water. The principle is generalizable to most risk assessment and management situations.
Principle 8. Pursuit of excellence in risk assessments and characterizations should facilitate integration of technical risk information and societal judgments, values, and preferences. The crucial elements that promise more informed decision making are: early and ample stakeholder involvement, particularly in problem formulation; full and understandable disclosure of all risk-relevant information; open and transparent discussions of uncertainties; flexibility to incorporate input from nonexpert stakeholders; willingness to reiterate when circumstances warrant; open recognition and unflinching documentation of all judgments; and focus on "net" risk reductions (i.e., accounting for substitution risks).
In a democratic society, full characterization of risks and full communication of options are simply the right things to do. ' 'I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion." Thomas Jefferson (circa 1775).
THE CASE FOR IMPROVING RISK CHARACTERIZATION (G. M. Gray)
In the past, methods of risk assessment were focused on setting standards, safe levels of exposure to hazardous materials. Codified in these methods is the concept of conservatism: deliberately inflating estimates of risk in order to avoid setting levels that might not be safe. In addition, a desire for uniformity means that the risks of all chemicals are assessed with the same methods, regardless of the underlying science. And in order to provide a benchmark for safety assessment, risks are often reported with single, point estimates of risk. To realize the promise that risk comparisons have to offer, risk characterization must overcome false precision, false consistency, and hidden choices to better serve risk managers and citizens.
False precision. Standard procedures for risk assessment are designed to generate what the Agency describes as a "plausible upper bound on risk" (USEPA, 1986) . When hard data are lacking, "default" assumptions are made in the risk assessment process that are designed to be conservative-minimizing the chances of underestimating the risk. Many risk characterizations simply report this single estimate of risk. A single estimate of carcinogenic risk, however, fails to communicate important scientific information about the hazards of a chemical. Because people focus on the numbers, key information about the nature of a chemical's carcinogenic potential and the origins of the risk estimate is frequently overlooked by regulators, reporters, and the public (Gray and Graham, 1991) . Qualitative descriptions, usually communicated as text or in carcinogen classification, are frequently neglected. No quantitative adjustment, or estimate of uncertainty, is attached to a risk estimate to distinguish a known human carcinogen such as radon from a compound with very weak evidence for human carcinogenicity, such as vinylidene chloride. For instance, a USEPA risk assessment estimated the nationwide risk from outdoor exposure to radon and vinylidene chloride at 10 deaths per year each (USEPA, 1989) . Although different carcinogen classifications were reported for each chemical, from these numbers the two chemicals would appear to be similar risks. Clearly, a single estimate of risk, 10 deaths per year, does not tell the whole story and does not allow meaningful comparison.
False consistency. The biggest problem with current risk characterization is that the default assumptions and methods are more scientifically plausible for some chemicals than for others. This means that "plausible upper bounds" of carcinogenic potency may be reasonable estimates for some compounds and wild overestimates for others. The default and conservative methods of risk assessment used by USEPA assume a dose-response function that is linear in the low-dose region and has no threshold. There is evidence that some agents, like certain types of radiation and directly mutagenic chemicals, may indeed have this type of doseresponse relationship. However, many scientists believe the linear, no-threshold approach to risk estimation is inappropriate for many other chemicals, such as some that are not direct mutagens (Upton, 1988) . Two plausible upper bound risk estimates that are generated through consistent procedures may have very different levels of scientific plausibility. The same risk assessment of outdoor exposure to air toxics (USEPA, 1989) reported annual cancer deaths of 115 from chloroform and 68 from ethylene dibromide. This would make chloroform appear to be the much greater public health problem. But ethylene dibromide is a compound for which the linear no-threshold model of risk may be scientifically quite appropriate while chloroform risk is generally believed to be very nonlinear, perhaps even with a threshold.
Hidden choices. The conduct of risk assessment involves many choices and assumptions because of incomplete theory and gaps in knowledge or data. If these choices differ between assessments, and the influence of the choices is hidden, the results will be difficult to compare. For example, when estimating exposure to pesticides for the general public, USEPA would like to know, in effect, the dose of pesticides "on the dinner plate." There are three ways to estimate the public's exposure to pesticides. In order of increasing realism they are: (1) theoretical maximum residue concentrations (TMRC), (2) farm gate data, and (3) residue monitoring. The difference between these methods can be quite large, TMRC estimates being higher than monitoring estimates by a factor of 10, 100, or even more (Table 1 ). In this case, then, identical risk estimates would mean very different things; in one case it would be a worst case number and for the other it would be a more realistic number, yet the distinction is likely to be lost in the current risk characterization process and will not be clear to a decision maker or the public.
Misleading comparisons. Increasingly, policy makers and risk managers are advocating risk comparisons and risk ranking. Risk comparison evaluates different hazards to health and compares the nature and magnitudes of the risks. Risk ranking attempts to put health hazards on a scale from large to small. Both of these approaches are seen as ways to improve the effectiveness of public health protection. It is critical that these comparisons be supported by complete risk characterization. Comparison of substitute chemicals is also growing in importance. For instance, USEPA's Dr. Lynn Goldman was quoted in Toxic Materials News (pp. 411-413) on December 6, 1993, as saying "Before I make a decision [to phase out a pesticide] I'd like to know what are the substitutes. . .and are those substitutes going to be more or less risky than what I'm phasing out?" But does current risk characterization give Dr. Goldman the information she needs to make these comparisons? Comparison, and prioritization, of the many public health risks facing our country is another reason for complete risk characterization. Since statistics for many other public health threats, such as motorcycle accidents or AIDS cases, are not deliberately inflated, environmental risk assessment must go beyond single plausible upper bound risk characterization to ensure meaningful comparisons.
Improved risk characterization. The key to making better use of risk assessment for risk comparisons is improved risk characterization. Risk assessment is a valuable tool which is subject to significant scientific uncertainty. Consumers of risk assessments must have knowledge of the scientific plausibility of different estimates of risk. Improved risk characterization means presenting risk estimates characterized by alternative assumptions and methods. Scientists, and the range of expertise and data they possess, must play a greater role in assessing risks. An example of a risk assessment relying on scientists, rather than conservative assumptions, has recently been published (Evans et at, 1994) . The result is not a single estimate of risk but a range of risk estimates based on different data and assumptions but weighted by plausibility as judged by scientists. This reflects the uncertainty inherent in any attempt to estimate cancer risk from environmental exposures. Better risk characterization should lead to a better appreciation of the strengths and limitations of the risk assessment process for informing risk comparisons. It will contribute to the scientific credibility of the risk assessment process as scientists see more of their data used in risk estimates. Finally, it will increase our confidence in our ability to compare risks and ensure sound risk management decisions.
RISK CHARACTERIZATION REDEFINED (D. W. North)
Many regulatory agencies have in practice relied on simple numerical summaries for risk characterization, such that the uncertainties and complexities of the risk assessment have not been effectively communicated to decision makers and to the interested and affected parties among the public. The NRC has issued a number of influential reports dealing with risk assessment, but some of the recommendations have been misinterpreted. Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process (NRC, 1983 ) is a case in point. This report stressed the importance of uncertainty in risk assessment and advocated conceptual distinction between risk assessment, a summarization of applicable science, and risk management, a decision making activity involving other issues in addition to science. The 1983 report called the Red Book has often been cited as having recommended strict separation between risk assessment and risk management. The following discussion will point out the discrepancy between what the Red Book or "misread book" recommends and what is attributed to it.
Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (NRC, 1996) and Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (NRC, 1994) both revisit issues that were considered in the 1983 NRC report. A main theme of the 1994 report is that ". . .when a government agency presents risk to government officials and the public, it should give not only a single point estimate of risk, but also the associated sources and magnitudes of uncertainty." Understanding Risk focuses on the use of risk assessments and the processes by which risk assessments are commissioned and communicated to users of risk assessments. These users include both the decision makers in regulatory agencies and the interested and affected individuals and groups among the public, which are often called "stakeholders." Understanding Risk stresses the need for effective communication about uncertainty to decision makers and stakeholders.
At the outset of the study the Understanding Risk committee rewrote its initial charge to encompass this broader view of risk characterization as a two-way communications process: "Risk Characterization is a complex and often controversial activity that is both a product of analysis and dependent on the processes of defining and conducting analysis. The study committee assessed opportunities to improve the characterization of risk so as to better inform decision making and resolution of controversies over risk. The study addressed: technical issues such as the representation of uncertainty; issues related to translating the outputs of conventional risk analysis into non-technical language; and social, behavioral, economic, and ethical aspects of risk that are relevant to the content or process of risk characterization" (NRC, 1996) . The committee then defined risk characterization as follows: "Risk characterization is a synthesis and summary of information about a potentially hazardous situation that addresses the needs and interests of decision makers and of interested and affected parties. Risk characterization is a prelude to decision making and depends on an iteractive, analytic-deliberative process" (NRC, 1996) . This definition is considerably broader than that used in the 1983 NRC report: "Risk characterization is the process of estimating the incidence of a health effect under the various conditions of exposure described in exposure assessment. It is performed by combining the exposure and dose-response as-sessments." The summary effects of the uncertainties in the preceding steps are described in this step. What frequently happens now in regulatory practice is that important uncertainties in the risk assessment are not included in the risk characterization, despite efforts within USEPA (1995) and in other regulatory agencies to encourage this practice.
The 1996 NRC report stressed that risk assessment is not a fixed process in which available scientific information is always summarized the same way (NRC, 1996) . Rather, the decision context will motivate significant differences, and the risk assessment process should be interactive. The concerns of the decision makers and stakeholders should frame the task to be carried out in the risk assessment, and then the risk assessment should inform the deliberation of decision makers and stakeholders as their interactions move toward decision making on regulation. The interaction between scientists doing the risk assessment and non-scientists who will use it should ensure not only that the risk assessment gets the science right, but also that the right science is assembled to inform the decision making process. The 1996 NRC report (NRC, 1996) includes discussion of a number of case studies in which an interactive, deliberative process informed by risk assessment has made a positive contribution toward good decision making on complex and contentious environmental issues.
An example of conventional practice, cited in contrast, is OSHA's recent "Final Rule" on methylene chloride issued on January 10, 1997. This rule reduces the permissible exposure limit (PEL) from 500 parts per million (ppm) in air to 25 ppm. OSHA asserts that its rule will prevent an "estimated 31 cancer deaths annually" among exposed workers. The basis for this estimate is a quantitative risk assessment based on mouse tumor data, using a physiologically based pharmacokinetics model developed by OSHA contractors, which was not made available for peer review prior to its publication. This OSHA rule, which highlights a single numerical estimate of cancer fatalities, has a spurious appearance of precision. Decision makers and stakeholders are not told that methylene chloride has not been confirmed as a human carcinogen, and that if methylene chloride is not a human carcinogen, no cancer deaths will be averted by OSHA's rule. Rather than a flexible rule, similar to the recently completed regulatory negotiation for coke oven emissions, or an emphasis on needed further research, such as in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 for ingested arsenic, OSHA's rule sets a revised PEL at 25 ppm for all uses of methylene chloride. Not surprisingly, this rule elicited substantial criticism during a Congressional hearing in 1997. The rule illustrates deficiencies in risk characterization that the recommendations in Understanding Risk (NRC, 1996) should help to correct.
Improving the public understanding of science is a particularly appropriate goal for 1997. Risk assessment and characterization should be used to improve public understanding of science and public policy on managing risks. Understanding Risk provides useful guidance to accomplish this objective and to dispel the misinterpretation of the NRC's 1983 Red Book that risk assessment should be separated from risk management in a democratic society.
